Mr. Rohde's situation in this video is a lot like the one he faced when held captive. The picture he painted of that experience was a dark and undecipherable as you can imagine. His insight that our view of the Taliban as some static organization is wholly inaccurate was chilling. It seems to be an ever-changing mass, coming together almost transactionally, and then spinning itself into its next iteration. This kind of inherent confusion was buttressed by the realization that the man who kidnapped Rohde was the man he was supposed to interview, a fact he didn't come into possession of until well into his captivity.
I don't know what a shit storm looks like, but the more I read about Afghanistan/Pakistan and the marauding hordes that rule its nether regions, I am definitely getting an image.
@TheSometimesWhy: It frustrates me when Rohde gives the impression that everyone thinks of the Taliban as a strict hierarchy. I know that when I was in Afghanistan, none of the people I worked with thought of it that way, and we all worked to get a better understanding of the various networks and the differing operational methods between each. For Rohde to come back and say how foolish we all are, and please, let him tell us how it really is, is incredibly irritating. #davidrohde
@Adah: I appreciate your frustration, but what if what he is reporting is accurate in the sense that our perceptions are inherently flawed because the thing we are trying to perceive defies static perception? That it is morphing every day into something that defies categorization, let alone a coherent policy for engaging militarily.
I, for one, wouldn't want Mr. Rohde's job, not so much for the obvious danger posed but because the act of communicating what he is learning as the result of being embedded as he is has to be beyond comprehension to most people. #davidrohde
@TheSometimesWhy: Well, of course the insurgency is constantly changing. But from reading Mr. Rohde's five part series from a few weeks ago, I'm not sure his understanding of it is as great as he thinks it is. He was kept in various rooms for seven months, and his main source of information appears to come from the low level men guarding him. The appearances of high level leaders in Rohde's narrative were remarkable because, by his own admission, they were fairly rare. Now, who knows, maybe when his book inevitably comes out, I'll be proven wrong and Rohde will reveal some remarkable details from these conversations with high level leaders. But he certainly didn't have anything terribly revealing in his Times piece that hasn't been said better and with a greater understanding in many other books. #davidrohde
@Adah: I don't see how you can take issue with Mr. Rohde for the lack of high-level leaders being conspicuously absent from his narrative. I dare say he was playing the cards he was dealt, so to speak. I think you're losing sight of the fact that his core mission was to interview the man who ultimately kidnapped him as part of an on-going series of reports. A reporter in the field functioning as Mr. Rohde did is per force sending back a mosaic of what he sees. Over-arching analysis isn't the immediate by-product of the kind of reportage he was responsible for. He is essentially a scout, hopefully a very insightful, well-informed one, but given the environmental obstacles to performing that task, i.e., staying alive, I think he did yeoman's work. What his pieces as they appeared in the NYTs revealed was the insanity of our presence there as currently constituted.
I would hope that people like yourself would wait for Mr. Rohde to have the luxury of some time to distill the sheer viscerality of that experience, and then see what analysis he puts forth. Given what he has been through, it not only seems fair but necessary if we are going to learn anything beyond what he has already imparted. #davidrohde
@TheSometimesWhy: I think it's unlikely that he got the larger picture of how the insurgency functions from talking to some guards. I understand he goes in for a mosaic piece, but you seem to think this will contribute to ground-breaking changes in how we view the Taliban and the Haqqani Network. I disagree. Rohde went in with an outdated and inaccurate impression of Afghan culture and local Taliban politics. That's what got him kidnapped - that and his threat assessment appeared to be limited to asking the advice of one French reporter who'd interviewed the same Taliban leader a few years ago. Rohde failed to update his own understanding of how the Taliban works. I'm not sure that reflects on the U.S. government's or even better informed citizens and reporters' impression of the Taliban.
I would recommend Seth Jones's book In the Graveyard of Empires for a much better understanding of our situation in Afghanistan right now, and how our actions along with local Pashtun culture and history have contributed to the rise of the insurgency in the last few years.
@Adah: Bollocks. Most Afghanis aren't kosher with the Taliban's world view. The Taliban are a foreign influence on Afghanistan from the tribal regions. In the 1970s Afghanistan was a place where hippies used to go to listen to live music and smoke hash. Afghans don't burn down girls schools, the influence of outside Islamist forces (and first-world foreign occupiers) have led to that.
@gawkimo: In the cities, sure. But the country has always been more traditional and rural, even predating the Soviet invasion. The Afghan monarchy basically controlled the large cities and left huge areas of the population for the local tribes to control. When the Soviets invaded, and during the war that followed, those middle and creative classes left the country en masse, most never to return. Those cities are all a lot less hippie-ish today. About one million fled to Iran, about three million to Pakistan. The Taliban emerged out of those Pakistani refugee camps along the border, from Peshawer down to Balochistan. In that instance, I suppose you're right, but the Taliban was always a Pashtun power, and in some ways that's more important than what side of the border it originated on. Most Pashtuns consider the Pashtun area of Pakistan to practically be part of Afghanistan anyway. In addition, many of these insurgents were already radicalized in the 1970s. It's not al Al Qaeda coming in and changing the poor defenseless Pashtun people. See Gulbuddin Hekmatyr in the 1970s and 1980s.
I didn't mean to imply that all Afghans are Taliban sympathizers. In this you are correct. But they're a lot more scared of the Taliban than they are of us. If the Taliban (and I'm using Taliban as shorthand for the various insurgent networks active in Afghanistan) tells them to never breathe a word when Americans are around or they'll kill their family, you can bet they're not going to be overly helpful. On top of this, the rural areas are still much more conservative and more likely to be sympathetic to the Taliban than they are to us. Our COIN strategy, if we choose to keep following it, has us supposedly withdrawing from these areas as they are so hard to control. These are the areas where you get your battles of Wanat or battle at COP Keating. #davidrohde
@Adah: Even in the traditional, rural countryside: they don't like the Taliban any more than the foreign occupiers. These are tribal folks who will side with anyone (Muslim or otherwise) who a.) Leave them alone and b.) pay them more. These folks don't sympathize with the Taliban for being "more conservative" -- they sympathize with anyone who adheres to a.) and b.). #davidrohde
@Adah: I would also point out that the Mughal Empire basically began in Afghanistan (well, Samarkand, but mostly in what we call Afghanistan today) and those Muslims drank alcohol and depicted Muhammad in paintings. Afghanistan is not the Whahabbist Kingdom we portray it to be. They are moderates when it come to religion -- they are radicals when it come to foreign intervention -- we can thank the Russians for that. #davidrohde
A very suspicious non-denial. If they paid a third party security consultant, who's to say some of their fee didn't go to a ransom. I mean, I saw that Meg Ryan movie too. #davidrohde
Paying the ransom and then lying about it was the right thing to do. It's the morality of any further pursuit of the story about it that's up for debate.
Waitaminute. Has anyone ever seen Andrea Peyser on the street? I think she's a composite cartoon like Ed Anger. Even her photo seems to be stitched from spare parts. #andreapeyser
I love that she uses "illegals" just as we'd expect her to. Do you think her editor has had a talk with her about her n-word use or does the editor just take it out on his/her own? #andreapeyser
There are some serious flaws with Rohde's "analysis" of the Taliban motivations. First of all - he declares the Quetta shura to be more moderate than the Haqqani network who captured him. Really? All the news reports I've seen consider the group down in Quetta to be pretty damn violent and extreme. Rohde continues to claim that our actions since 2001 are what galvanized the Taliban into extremist tendancies. Did he forget the actions of the Taliban government from 1996-2001? This was a group that outlawed educating women, tortured ethnic and religious minorities, and sheltered international terrorist organizations. The Taliban sheltered Al Qaeda, allowed them to carry out attacks against Western targets. But it's our actions since 2001 that have caused them to be extreme? Seriously? He actually says he did not realize how violent and extreme the Taliban had become.
Not that Peyser is sane, but Rohde's article is worthy of critique, and I've been glad to see that some are doing it. Peyser isn't the best example of this, but there are some decent critiques floating around out there. #andreapeyser
11/16/09
11/13/09
I don't know what a shit storm looks like, but the more I read about Afghanistan/Pakistan and the marauding hordes that rule its nether regions, I am definitely getting an image.
And it is not pretty. #davidrohde
11/13/09
11/13/09
I, for one, wouldn't want Mr. Rohde's job, not so much for the obvious danger posed but because the act of communicating what he is learning as the result of being embedded as he is has to be beyond comprehension to most people. #davidrohde
11/13/09
11/13/09
I would hope that people like yourself would wait for Mr. Rohde to have the luxury of some time to distill the sheer viscerality of that experience, and then see what analysis he puts forth. Given what he has been through, it not only seems fair but necessary if we are going to learn anything beyond what he has already imparted. #davidrohde
11/13/09
I would recommend Seth Jones's book In the Graveyard of Empires for a much better understanding of our situation in Afghanistan right now, and how our actions along with local Pashtun culture and history have contributed to the rise of the insurgency in the last few years.
[www.amazon.com] #davidrohde
11/13/09
11/13/09
I didn't mean to imply that all Afghans are Taliban sympathizers. In this you are correct. But they're a lot more scared of the Taliban than they are of us. If the Taliban (and I'm using Taliban as shorthand for the various insurgent networks active in Afghanistan) tells them to never breathe a word when Americans are around or they'll kill their family, you can bet they're not going to be overly helpful. On top of this, the rural areas are still much more conservative and more likely to be sympathetic to the Taliban than they are to us. Our COIN strategy, if we choose to keep following it, has us supposedly withdrawing from these areas as they are so hard to control. These are the areas where you get your battles of Wanat or battle at COP Keating. #davidrohde
11/13/09
11/13/09
11/13/09
11/02/09
11/02/09
10/22/09
10/22/09
10/22/09
10/22/09
10/22/09
10/22/09
10/22/09
10/22/09
10/22/09
10/22/09
(BTW, how much do I love you for the Frankenhooker reference??) #andreapeyser
10/22/09
10/22/09
10/22/09
10/22/09
10/22/09
10/22/09
10/22/09
10/22/09
10/22/09
10/22/09
10/22/09
Not that Peyser is sane, but Rohde's article is worthy of critique, and I've been glad to see that some are doing it. Peyser isn't the best example of this, but there are some decent critiques floating around out there. #andreapeyser
10/22/09
10/22/09