The credit rating agencies obviously were a huge problem in this disaster, but blaming them, alone, for AIG is pretty asinine. There were a whole number of issues with AIG, including the fact that all of the i-banks (including Goldman) who did business with AIG knew that AIG's credit rating was problematic (after all, they do their own due diligence, with people who are paid a lot more than S&P's analysts).
The problem with the rating agencies is that they were being asked to be the gatekeepers/quasi-regulators in a scheme of private securitization where everyone's incentives are skewed. The whole promise that an unregulated private label securitization could be more efficient and better managed than if it were regulated is the key here. You can replace the rating agencies all day, but unless you start aligning incentives at the origination, securitization, and marketing levels, you'd still have this problem.
The reason the GOP is blaming the rating agencies and Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac for the crisis is because if you buy into their silly narrative (as the author of this post clearly has), you can maybe pretend that this whole crisis isn't in fact a massive indictment of their ideological worldview that unregulated markets can produce optimal outcomes. Because if you don't believe that, then you basically have no reason to ever vote Republican again, other than because you hate minority groups.
The credit agencies screwed up, but the real blame still lies with the fact that the government destroyed all incentives for them to operate honestly and transparently. James Surowiecki summed it up nicely in a September article in The New Yorker ([www.newyorker.com]): "[W]e need a divorce: the rating agencies shouldn’t be government-sanctioned and government-protected institutions and their judgments shouldn’t be part of the rules that govern how investors can act." #aig
AIG was either going to be a ward of the state - AAA - or not - D. That was probably the one thing that ratings agencies did right in late 2008! Regulators were oscillating between a bailout and failure. Consequently, asset ratings oscillated from high to low. What the fuck do you expect anyone to rate a company laden with junk debt absent government backing, John? They were either worthless or bulletproof - such is the magic of being hooked up to the printing press.
It makes perfect sense for credit rating agencies to say AIG's balance sheet was full of sudden junk. Remember, until 5 minutes ago the underlying assets hedged by AIG's CDS positions had been rated AAA (which is what the S&P employees, which you quoted out of context, were talking about - a CDO, not a CDS). If the risk of default for a hedged asset is AAA, why wouldn't the default hedge be? #aig
@Unsolicited Advice: Your statements are interesting, but do NOT take away from the validity of the argument that the taxpayers were practically blackmailed into saving AIG and the banks.
Based upon the continued job losses, tight credit, foreclosures, and bankruptices, with an official unemployment rate of 10% (and 17% when factoring in underemployed), it is not at all apparent that letting AIG or banks fail would have been worse than what we have now.
And what we have now, based on an outsider's perspective, are banks giving million dollar bonuses while people are going hungry, losing their homes and jobs, and not able to take care of their children.
It's immoral. The bailout was immoral as well. It hasn't helped on the jobs front at all, except for those bankers who needed their bonuses. #aig
Yes, taxpayers were blackmailed. They were not, however, blackmailed by ratings agencies. I'm disputing the analysis in the post, not the legitimacy of popular outrage surrounding the financial industry.
And hate to break it to you, but as bad as jobs are now they'd have been worse without massive financial stimulus. Our economy, at the low end, is a phantasm created by massively risky debt arrangements. Welcome to post-America. #aig
Actually, it was in a way, just it was to exising companies that can't function without substantial debt. Which is to say "every corporation in America." #aig
@Unsolicited Advice: I'm willing to take that risk. If Goldman Sach saying things could have been worse: Call its bluff. If a corporation says it won't open shop in your city without massive tax breaks: call its bluff. What Americans need is the guts to engage in more BLUFF CALLING.
The AIG bailout took place well after that was common knowledge.
AIG's ratings were intrinsically tied to CDS ratings - insurance against the default of CDO's - not CDO ratings, those pyramids of mortgage debt. The crucial error that ratings agencies made was to fail to acknowledge the default risk inherent in CDO's.
Geithner's choice was for AIG to face a claims crisis that would send it to bankruptcy (which would have threatened the viability of many street banks as they took massive losses on CDS hedges) or bail it out. Ratings agencies would simply have to mark the result as D or AAA - absent the bailout there wasn't a solvent company left to rate. And they certainly weren't behind Geithner's inexplicable decision to allow the taxpayer to be a counterparty at no discount. That is and remains a wholly unjustifiable action unilaterally decided upon by an overmatched regulator. #aig
Congratulations on your post-hoc risk-taking bent. Tattoos and a Harley Davidson for you, sir. Krugman would call you a "liquidationist" and brand you with a fleur-de-lis. #aig
@Unsolicited Advice: Agreed. I don't mean to imply that Geithner's actions can be placed at the feet of the ratings agencies. I was just pointing out that their poor decisions long precede any questions about AIG's rating. #aig
@Unsolicited Advice: Yes, excuse me for being such a rebel thinking the world would continue to rotate without Goldman Sachs. I'm such a rebel tool! #aig
The only good that can come out of this mess is the death of the "kill Social Security and let Wall Street run it" movement. Then again, (collective) we have very short memories. #goldmansachs
I don't understand the proposed solution that the government could have given Goldman Sachs a haircut on their insurance without giving the troubled banks one as well. Goldman had legally binding contracts with AIG for the full amount. Goldman owes their shareholders a fiduciary duty to get as much as possible for those contracts. Once the government stepped in to prevent AIG's bankruptcy, the government did not have a legal leg to stand on to pay some contracts but not others, so Goldman could not have taken less than the full contract amount without their shareholders (e.g. your 401K) rightly being up in arms over it. Yes, everyone was willing to negotiate for less when they thought AIG might go bankrupt, but once AIG was not in danger of bankruptcy, the negotiations effectively ended. Cook seems to accept that the failing banks would not have been able to take a substantial loss on the contracts and thus would have forced AIG into bankruptcy (or gone bankrupt themselves), which means the AIG bailout was necessary. Once that happens, why negotiate for less than your contract when the counter-party (now the government) can afford to pay 100% and has no legally valid reason not to? I don't know where the idea comes from that Geithner could have just unilaterally decided to not pay Goldman on its contracts while at the same time paying other banks. It's not a matter of Geithner favoring Goldman, it's just basic contract law and the reality of having a deep pocket behind AIG's legal obligations. #goldmansachs
Geithner (and Summers) will go down as two huge Obama mistakes. The favoritism, the secrecy, the cozy Wall St. relationship---just disgusting. #goldmansachs
@lackadaisical: The AIG payment to GS is a separate matter from the TARP money that GS returned to the government.
"If Goldman were losing money like every other bank, would we like them better?" I’d hope not, but you have a point. I think the problem is not that GS is minting money this year, it’s the fact that it is proposing astronomical bonuses this year. Lloyd B could have been a bit more sensitive to how this would be perceived. It’s not written in stone that compensation has to be 50% of revenues. It would have been more prudent to add $10 billion to reserves to cushion the blow should another 2008 happen. Believe me, everyone at GS would still be more than adequately compensated. #goldmansachs
@registered: Well, that's only part of the problem. The real problem is two-fold: number one, Goldman most certainly DID need the TARP money. Technically they may not have actually needed the dollar amount, but they needed the gov guarantee which it represented. And number two, the main reason they're minting money now is because the gov has tilted the field in their favor. The gov stood by and allowed Lehman to fail, one of Goldman's major competitors, so Goldman is now eating Lehman's lunch. Additionally, the favorable funding rates which the gov is providing to GS (and others) makes it nearly impossible to not make money. So yeah, they're taking advantage of the opportunities presented to them (and good for them), but those opportunities exist due to gov largesse, not due to GS creating them. #goldmansachs
@charliebabbles: I don't disagree that every financial institution probably needed some sort of guarantee during the worst days of the crisis. Did I say they didn't?
I also agree with you that GS benefitted from Lehman's collapse, and the subsequent capital raising efforts of other financial institutions. Did I say they didn't? I just said they were minting money (w/o saying what was helping) and had no need to pay 50% of their windfall revenues to employees.
Please re-read my comment. I don't think we disagree. #goldmansachs
Dark pools are a bit overhyped thanks to a terrible name. The only real problem with them is that they run counter to the ECMH. If you can trade against a dark pool, then you can buy and sell shares based on your knowledge of the firm without that knowledge becoming built into the exchange price that everyone else sees. That's the whole thing about executing at the right price. Without the pool, major buyers and sellers end up front running themselves as they can't get all the shares they want at the same price. Supply tightens and the price goes up as a result of illiquidity. If enough people use dark pools, the ECMH is unequivocally false in practice regardless of whether it is true in theory. If you trade against the pool, no one sees your trade and you avoid the short term liquidity crunch but you also get away with making the transaction without 'showing your cards' to the broader market. So the issue of dark pools really comes down to whether you think that ma and pa shareholder are entitled to rely on a stock's price as a reflection of everyone's valuations, or if you are ok with saying that share prices are just a function of what people on the exchange are willing to pay today - if you want a valuation go do it yourself. #goldmansachs
Dark pools were established so institutional and UHNW clients could set market orders to transact extremely large amounts of shares without disclosing them to day-traders and other entities that would bid those positions up or down. Do you know what actually happened when Blue Horseshoe loved Anacott Steel, John? Dark pools were established strictly because of scenarios like that scene in Gekko's office where the foreign banker implores him to stop screwing up his acquisition of a controlling stake by convincing other buyers to jump into an otherwise-moribund investment. This only benefits Goldman insofar as it makes them able to service their clients better. The real victim in a world without dark pools would be institutional buyers and sellers. #goldmansachs
11/18/09
The problem with the rating agencies is that they were being asked to be the gatekeepers/quasi-regulators in a scheme of private securitization where everyone's incentives are skewed. The whole promise that an unregulated private label securitization could be more efficient and better managed than if it were regulated is the key here. You can replace the rating agencies all day, but unless you start aligning incentives at the origination, securitization, and marketing levels, you'd still have this problem.
The reason the GOP is blaming the rating agencies and Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac for the crisis is because if you buy into their silly narrative (as the author of this post clearly has), you can maybe pretend that this whole crisis isn't in fact a massive indictment of their ideological worldview that unregulated markets can produce optimal outcomes. Because if you don't believe that, then you basically have no reason to ever vote Republican again, other than because you hate minority groups.
11/17/09
11/17/09
That should be the title of the history of the crisis #aig
11/17/09
Suuuuure they did. Like Robin Williams holding himself hostage. #aig
11/17/09
11/17/09
[www.econ.puc-rio.br]
AIG was either going to be a ward of the state - AAA - or not - D. That was probably the one thing that ratings agencies did right in late 2008! Regulators were oscillating between a bailout and failure. Consequently, asset ratings oscillated from high to low. What the fuck do you expect anyone to rate a company laden with junk debt absent government backing, John? They were either worthless or bulletproof - such is the magic of being hooked up to the printing press.
It makes perfect sense for credit rating agencies to say AIG's balance sheet was full of sudden junk. Remember, until 5 minutes ago the underlying assets hedged by AIG's CDS positions had been rated AAA (which is what the S&P employees, which you quoted out of context, were talking about - a CDO, not a CDS). If the risk of default for a hedged asset is AAA, why wouldn't the default hedge be? #aig
11/17/09
Based upon the continued job losses, tight credit, foreclosures, and bankruptices, with an official unemployment rate of 10% (and 17% when factoring in underemployed), it is not at all apparent that letting AIG or banks fail would have been worse than what we have now.
And what we have now, based on an outsider's perspective, are banks giving million dollar bonuses while people are going hungry, losing their homes and jobs, and not able to take care of their children.
It's immoral. The bailout was immoral as well. It hasn't helped on the jobs front at all, except for those bankers who needed their bonuses. #aig
11/17/09
Yes, taxpayers were blackmailed. They were not, however, blackmailed by ratings agencies. I'm disputing the analysis in the post, not the legitimacy of popular outrage surrounding the financial industry.
And hate to break it to you, but as bad as jobs are now they'd have been worse without massive financial stimulus. Our economy, at the low end, is a phantasm created by massively risky debt arrangements. Welcome to post-America. #aig
11/17/09
11/17/09
Actually, it was in a way, just it was to exising companies that can't function without substantial debt. Which is to say "every corporation in America." #aig
11/17/09
11/17/09
11/17/09
The AIG bailout took place well after that was common knowledge.
AIG's ratings were intrinsically tied to CDS ratings - insurance against the default of CDO's - not CDO ratings, those pyramids of mortgage debt. The crucial error that ratings agencies made was to fail to acknowledge the default risk inherent in CDO's.
Geithner's choice was for AIG to face a claims crisis that would send it to bankruptcy (which would have threatened the viability of many street banks as they took massive losses on CDS hedges) or bail it out. Ratings agencies would simply have to mark the result as D or AAA - absent the bailout there wasn't a solvent company left to rate. And they certainly weren't behind Geithner's inexplicable decision to allow the taxpayer to be a counterparty at no discount. That is and remains a wholly unjustifiable action unilaterally decided upon by an overmatched regulator. #aig
11/17/09
Congratulations on your post-hoc risk-taking bent. Tattoos and a Harley Davidson for you, sir. Krugman would call you a "liquidationist" and brand you with a fleur-de-lis. #aig
11/17/09
11/18/09
10/27/09
4060 Cents on the Dollar, Then Geithner Stepped In10/27/09
4060 Cents on the Dollar, Then Geithner Stepped In10/27/09
4060 Cents on the Dollar, Then Geithner Stepped In10/27/09
4060 Cents on the Dollar, Then Geithner Stepped InIf Goldman were losing money like every other bank, would we like them better? #goldmansachs
10/27/09
"If Goldman were losing money like every other bank, would we like them better?" I’d hope not, but you have a point. I think the problem is not that GS is minting money this year, it’s the fact that it is proposing astronomical bonuses this year. Lloyd B could have been a bit more sensitive to how this would be perceived. It’s not written in stone that compensation has to be 50% of revenues. It would have been more prudent to add $10 billion to reserves to cushion the blow should another 2008 happen. Believe me, everyone at GS would still be more than adequately compensated. #goldmansachs
10/28/09
10/28/09
I also agree with you that GS benefitted from Lehman's collapse, and the subsequent capital raising efforts of other financial institutions. Did I say they didn't? I just said they were minting money (w/o saying what was helping) and had no need to pay 50% of their windfall revenues to employees.
Please re-read my comment. I don't think we disagree. #goldmansachs
10/27/09
4060 Cents on the Dollar, Then Geithner Stepped In10/27/09
4060 Cents on the Dollar, Then Geithner Stepped InThat means they wanted to pay 60 cents on the dollar. #goldmansachs
10/27/09
10/27/09
4060 Cents on the Dollar, Then Geithner Stepped In10/27/09
4060 Cents on the Dollar, Then Geithner Stepped In08/07/09